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Discussion of which alternative is administratively preferable should
not, however, be permitted to obscure the basic objections to the pres-
ent sweeping disqualification. Either alternative is preferable to exist-
ing statutory provisions. The important consideration is that there is
no reason from the point of view of social desirability to deny benefits
to workers who are unemployed either because of the attempts of an
employer to change the status quo by insistence on changed terms and
conditions -of work or because of his refusal to offer work except on
conditions which are substandard or illegal. The issue is not whether
strikes are "voluntary," or whether the payment of benefits would
represent an award of "strike or lockout" benefits and thus place the
state in an "unneutral" position, but whether statutory provisions
should be drafted to permit determinations to be made in the light of
objective social policy without regard to the existence of a labor dispute.
The answer seems clear. The statutory provision disqualifying workers
unemployed as the result of a labor dispute should be amended to
exclude from disqualification workers unemployed as the result of:
(1) a lockout,
(2) the failure or refusal of the employer to conform to the laws of
the United States or the state pertaining to wages, hours or
other conditions of work,
(3) the employer's insistence on wages, hours or other conditions of
work less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the
locality, or
(4) a requirement that employees join a company union or resign
from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization.
Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of
Unemployment Compensation
EARLE V. SIMRELLt
PERELAPs it should be taken for granted that the payment of un-
employment compensation does not depend upon any employer's fault
in causing unemployment. Yet even when this is recognized as a
matter of law, there is evidence in judicial and administrative deci-
sions of strong emotional resistance to such law. For example, a Wis-
consin circuit court, after upholding an award of benefits to a woman
worker whose last employer refused to reemploy her after childbirth,
and who could find no other suitable work, expressed its regrets:
t Assistant General Counsel, Federal Security Agency.
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"This case is a vivid illustration of the working of the unemploy-
ment compensation act. It was no fault of the Folding Furniture
Works that this employe became pregnant. Yet the employer is
held liable ...
"The employer was responsible for the unemployment only in the
sense that he let her go and did not take her back. But when it is
recognized that he had to fill her position while she was disabled, in
order to get the work done, it can readily be understood why he
would not take her back; because he did not need two employes to
do the work of one, we assume; and if he took her back he would
have to discharge the new employe and be liable for unemployment
benefits to this new employe.
"Whichever employe the employer elected to employ when Mrs.
Woyak sought work again, the employer was going to be forced to
pay benefits. He was 'between the devil and the deep sea'. And
that is just where the Wisconsin law places an employer who hap-
pens to' get an employe who becomes sick for less than a year. The
law is in the interest of the sick employe. It is hard on the em-
ployer." 1
It is a short step from a feeling that unemployment compensation re-
gardless of employer fault may be law but is not justice to an interpre-
tation of the law to deny compensation for unemployment if an em-
ployer contesting the claim is not at fault.
In Michigan a claimant had asked for a change of shift in order to be
at home to care for her three-year-old child during the hours when she
could get no one else to stay with the child. She was refused because
her foreman thought so well of her work that he would not let her go.
A circuit court found "that there was nothing to show that there was any
obligation on the part of the employer to change shift for her," and dis-
qualified her for having "left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to the employer." 2 The decisive effect given to the ab-
sence of any "obligation on the part of the employer" to make it pos-
sible for the claimant to care for her child and still keep her job was
supported by the court's general understanding of the nature of the
unemployment compensation law, expressed as follows:
". .. this act is an act to help the economic condition of the State
and its people to alleviate suffering, embarrassment, and unrest
caused by unemployment due to the fault or acts of the employer.
If an employer refuses or fails to cooperate in stabilization of labor
or employment he is penalized by being required to pay a larger
per cent. of the amount of his payroll into the insurance fund. If
1. Folding Furniture Works, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., Wis. C. C., Dane Cy. Dec. 3,
1941, CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-Wis. 1950.07. Unemployment compensation in
all states is paid from state funds to which employers contribute.
2. Courney v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., Genesee Cy. (Mich.) C. C., March 15,
1945 (unreported) (emphasis supplied).
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on the other hand he does cooperate and assists in stabilization of
labor, thereby reducing the unemployment of the head of the fam-
ily, and so betters the economic condition of the people and State,
he is rewarded by being required to only pay a lesser per cent. of the
amount of his payroll into the insurance fund." '
A failure "to cooperate in stabilization" might have been found in the
foreman's refusal to attempt any adjustment, but, since the employer
had not failed in any "obligation," the court saw the claimant's unem-
ployment as outside the purposes of the unemployment compensation
law.
If the feeling is conveyed to a legislature that "it is hard on the
employer" if unemployment compensation is paid for unemployment
for which he is not to blame, the result may be piecemeal amendment
of the statute to compromise in some degree between the test of
employer-fault and the basic purpose of alleviating the effects of unem-
ployment in order to promote the general welfare. The West Virginia
law was amended in 1943 to disqualify a worker who "left work volun-
tarily without good cause, involving fault on the part of the employer." 4
This express injection of employer fault is rare,5 but a substantial
number of legislatures have inserted such indefinite phrases as "at-
tributable to the employer" to limit the "good cause" which will be
recognized for a worker's voluntarily leaving a job.5 Such amendments
serve as vehicles for the sense of injustice of tribunals taking the
employer-fault approach, even though in the light of the purpose of
unemployment compensation laws to promote the public welfare a
more reasonable interpretation would be independent of employer fault.
Two tendencies thus cooperate: (1) to subject contested issues of
interpretation to a sense of injustice in the payment of benefits unless a
previous employer is in some way to blame for the unemployment, and
3. The circuit court's general theory of the law is in contrast to the Michigan Supreme
Court's view in Lawrence Baking Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 303 Mich. 193,
13 N. IV. (2d) 260 (1944), discussed later in this article. Claimants are apt to Le in a poor
position to carry appeals to a court of last resort. Consequently the law, is often settled for
them in the lower courts.
4. West Virginia Unemployment Compensation Law, Art. VI, § 4, as amended,
V. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) § 2366(73) (emphasis supplied),
followed by amendment in 1944 of Section 5(a) of the Virginia unemployment compen~a-
tion law.
5. Query whether even in these provisions fault is used in the sense of a breach of legal
obligation. The word as used in statutory declarations of policy to provide compenwation
for workers "unemployed through no fault of their own" has been construed to mean causes
"subject to the employee's own volition." Huiet v. Schwob Mlfg. Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S. E.
(2d) 743 (1943). The concept of employer fault, as reflected, for e.xample, in the two judicial
statements quoted above, is never precisely defined in the decisions which seem to show its
influence.
6. See Kempfer, Disgutification for Voluntary Lcaring and Misconduct, page 147
at page 150 supra.
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(2) to adopt piecemeal legislation more or less susceptible to such inter-
pretation.
These twin tendencies have prompted the Chairman of the Social
Security Board to describe as one of the "major weaknesses of existing
State laws" that "The function of disqualifications is shifting from
limiting benefits to workers unemployed through no fault of their own
to limiting payments to cases where the employer is at fault." 7
General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Compensation.
Before experience rating, unemployment conipensation laws were
challenged as arbitrary for their failure to relate the burden of con-
tributions to responsibility for causing unemployment. When the
Alabama law was upheld by the United States Supreme Court,8 Justice
Sutherland's dissent argued that due process was denied because "a
disproportionately heavy burden will be imposed by the tax upon those
whose operations contribute least to the evils of unemployment, and,
correspondingly, the burden will be lessened in respect of those whose
operations contribute most." I "Let us suppose," he wrote, "that A,
an employer of a thousand men, has retained all of his employees. B,
an employer of a thousand men, has discharged half of his employees.
The tax is upon the payroll of each. A, who has not discharged a single
workman, is taxed upon his payroll twice as much as B, although the
operation of B's establishment has contributed enormously to the evil
of unemployment while that of A has contributed nothing at all." 10
Such a result the dissenters thought clearly unreasonable, but even the
dissent argued only that each employer should bear the costs of un-
employment resulting from his own operations, without reference to
whether the employer was to blame for such unemployment or could
have prevented it."
The United States Supreme Court, however, held it to be no valid
objection that "those who pay the tax may not have contributed to
the unemployment .. ,, 12 The majority pointed out that "Noth-
ing is more familiar in taxation than the imposition of a tax upon a
class or upon individuals who enjoy no direct benefit from its expendi-
ture, and who are not responsible for the condition to be remedied." 13
7. Letter of A. J. Altmeyer to War Mobilization Director'Byrnes, June 2, 1944, re-
printed in 90 Cong. Rec., Aug. 8, 1944, at 6841-2. See also George E. Bigge (Member, So-
cial Security Board), Strength and Weakness of Our Unemployment Compensation Program
in CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U. S. A., SOCIAL SECURITY iN AMERICA (Addresses,
Nat. Conf. on Social Security, 1944) 24.
8. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937).
9. Id. at 527-8.
10. Id. at 528.
11. Id. at 530-1.
12. Id. at 521.
13. Id. at 521-2.
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This, which would be unquestioned as to taxes for general revenue,
was regarded as no more objectionable when special taxes are levied for
specific purposes. Common examples were cited, such as cigarette
taxes and chain store taxes for schools, liquor taxes for old-age pen-
sions, gasoline taxes, beer taxes, and cosmetics taxes for unemploy-
ment relief. "A corporation," Justice Stone noted, "cannot object to
the use of the taxes which it pays for the maintenance of schools because
it has no children." 14
The basis of the law, and the test of its validity, was held to be the
public purpose of relieving unemployment. That unemployment com-
pensation meets this test the United States Supreme Court, in accord
with the courts of Alabama, Massachusetts, and New York,1 3 left no
doubt:
"We need not labor the point that expenditures for the relief of
the unemployed, conditioned on unemployment alone, without
proof of indigence of recipients of the benefits, is a permissible use
of state funds. For the past six years the nation, unhappily, has
been placed in a position to learn at first hand the nature and
extent of the problem of unemployment, and to appreciate its pro-
found influence upon the public welfare. . . . The evils of the at-
tendant social and economic wastage permeate the entire social
structure. . . . When public evils ensue from individual misfor-
tunes or needs, the legislature may strike at the evil at its source. If
the purpose is legitimate because public, it will not be defeated
because the execution of it involves payments to individuals." IG
The test of public purpose being met, employer contributions were
viewed as a legitimate means of financing the social benefits of the
legislation and, in general, of distributing its costs. "Since the [con-
tributing employers] may not complain if the expenditure has no rela-
tion to the taxed class of which they are members, they obviously may
not complain because the expenditure has some relation to that class,
that those benefited are employees of those taxed; or because the
legislature has adopted the expedient of spreading the burden of the
tax to the consuming public by imposing it upon those who make and
sell commodities." 17
Legislative Policy and the Effect of Experince Rating.
Has the system of variable tax rates, known as "experience rating,"
changed all this to require that the public purpose of alleviating the
14. Id. at 523.
15. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 234 Ala. 249, 174 So. 516 (1937); Howe3
Brothers Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 296 Mass. 275, 5 N. E. (2d) 720 (1936);
Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936).
16. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 515, 516, 518 (1937).
17. Id. at 525.
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effectg of unemployment be limited by responsibility on the part of
individual employers in causing it?'8 And, whether for constitutional
reasons or otherwise, have state legislatures framed their unemploy-
ment compensation laws, with experience rating, to exclude unem-
ployment for which a claimant's former employers are not to blame?
The Supreme Courts of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have
rejected such limitations, in Minnesota and Wisconsin on issues of
statutory construction, in Michigan on issues of both statutory con-
struction and constitutionality.9
The first of the three decisions, in Boynton Cab Company v. Neubeck,
came in Wisconsin, the Mt. Sinai of experience rating. A taxicab driver
was discharged after having had three accidents during eight weeks of
employment. The employer contended that he had been "discharged
for misconduct connected with his employment" and therefore under
the statute should be disqualified. 2 Negligence in causing the accidents,
and violation of the employer's rules in failing to report two of them
and in failing to comply with the employer's standards of care, were
alleged. The Commission found that the driver had been "partly re-
sponsible for the accidents" but awarded benefits in the conviction
that mere negligence or minor violation of the employer's rules, with-
out some wilful or wanton disregard of the employer's interests, did
not constitute "misconduct" as the term was intended in the disquali-
fication.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Commission emphasized the
significance of the questions of legislative policy underlying the spe-
cific disqualification. In answer to the employer's justification for the
discharge, the Commission interpreted the disqualification as having
"nothing to do with the question of rightness or wrongness of the em-
ployer's act in discharging. He may be entirely justified, for example,
in the case of an inefficient employee who is not worth retaining, with-
out in any manner affecting the employee's right to benefits." 21 They
reiterated this position more broadly:
"When an employee suing for damages for breach of contract
prevails, he is recovering damages for the injury inflicted on him by
his employer. In the field of unemployment compensation, eligi-
18. For the theories and methods of this system see Arnold, Experience Rating, page
218 infra.
19. Lawrence Baking Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W.
(2d) 260 (19,44), cert. denied, 65 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1944); Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp.,
18 N. W. (2d) 249 (Minn. 1945); Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N. W.
630 (1941).
20. Wis. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) § 108.04(4)(a) disqualifies for benefits a worker who
"has been discharged by the employer for misconduct connected with his employment."
On this disqualification in state laws generally see Kempfer, Disqualification for Voluntary
Leaving and Misconduct, page 147 supra.
21. Brief of Industrial Comm., p. 40.
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bility for benefits is in no manner conditioned on the rightness or
wrongness of the employer's severance of the employment relation,
but contrarily is conditioned on whether the rights, which an em-
ploye has accrued during the course of his employment, and which
would normally be available to him at the time of discharge, are to
be considered as nullified by a penalty imposed out of public policy
considerations." 22
The State Advisory Committee on Unemployment Compensation,
representing employers and labor, and the Wisconsin Manufacturers
Association filed briefs as amici curiae supporting the argument of the
Commission. 23 All three briefs were clear and emphatic in arguing, not
only the consistency of their construction with experience rating, but
its downright necessity to the purposes of experience rating. Said the
Commission, " 'Experience rating' was certainly not designed for the
purpose of allowing employers to restrict and sabotage the efficient
operation of the primary purpose of any unemployment compensation
law, namely, the payment of benefits to out-of-work employes. Noth-
ing could strike the cause of experience rating a more grievous blow
than to have it prostituted to this purpose." 24 The Advisory Com-
mittee urged that the employer's construction would be "flagrantly
destructive" of the legislative purposes both in providing benefits and
in providing an incentive to employers to regularize employment :2
". .. if mere inefficiency, lack of normal productivity, or trivial
peccadillos discoverable in the case of a great many low-income
employes, are 'misconduct,' then an employer can drastically reduce
his working force, and equally augment the ranks of the unem-
ployed, by laying off the relatively inefficient members of his force,
because of their inefficiency, without cost to himself. His ability to
do that would diminish just that much the incentive afforded by
the operation of the law to regularize his employment and eliminate
such lay-offs.
"It is no answer to the foregoing argument to say that it is hard
on the employer to require him to pay unemployment compensa-
tion to an employe whom he was justified in firing because of ineffi-
ciency. Unemployment compensation is not a penalty imposed on
the employer because of fault on his part, but rather is an involun-
22. Ibid.
23. The brief of the State Advisory Committee stated (p. 9) as positively as the Com-
mission that the Commission and the court were not concerned ith "the question of the
employer's right to discharge, or of his moral or legal justification for Eo doing." It added,
"The man last hired and first laid off is the inefficient fellow, the one who dcas not pay a
profit when business is poor, the one who is prone to make mistakes. If compensation is
denied to him, because the employer selects him for discharge on account of those qualities,
then the statute will defeat its own purpose, by withholding benefits from those who need
them most." .1d. at 22.
24. Brief of Industrial Comm., pp. 18-9.
25. Brief of State Advisory Committee, pp. 20-S.
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tary contribution for the relief of unemployment attendant upon
his operations." 26
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a strong opinion largely reflecting
the briefs, affirmed the Commission's award of benefits, holding their
interpretation of the "misconduct" provision to be essential to the
"principal purpose and object under the act of alleviating the evils of
unemployment." 27 Although the court did not discuss the relation of
experience rating to the case, this factor obviously did not move it to
modify its view.
In Michigan the same basic issue between public purpose in relieving
unemployment and employer-fault in causing it was raised in Lawrence
Baking Company v. Unemployment Compensation Commission," a case
involving the labor dispute disqualification."9 The claimants, with
other employees, had gone on strike. The employer's operations were
interrupted for only about fifteen minutes. New employees were im-
mediately hired and there was no further stoppage of the employer's
operations although the strikers' union continued to picket the com-
pany plant. On the day after the strike began, the employer notified
each striking employee by letter that he had been replaced by a new
employee.
Since the Michigan labor dispute disqualification applies only to a
claimant's weeks of unemployment "due to a stoppage of work existing
because of a labor dispute in the establishment in which he is or was
last employed,"3 the state agency awarded benefits for weeks of unem-
ployment after the stoppage of the employer's operations had been
ended by replacement of the striking employees. The employer con-
tended that this was contrary to the language of the disqualification
and the general declaration of legislative policy in enacting the unem-
ployment compensation law; but the referee, the appeal board, the
circuit court, and finally the state supreme court all held that the law
(1) did not bar benefits for unemployment after the employer had re-
placed the strikers and resumed operations, and (2) did not contem-
plate any determination of the merits of the labor dispute. In both of
these respects the decisions followed those of the supreme courts of Ne-
braska and North Carolina and the administrative interpretation which
was already established both in Great Britain and in this country when
the Michigan Legislature adopted the language in question."1
26. Id. at 26-7.
27. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 258-9, 296 N. W. 636, 640 (1941).
28. 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944), cert. denied, 65 Sup. Ct. 43 (U. S. 1944).
29. On the general subject of this disqualification see Lesser, Labor Disputes and Un-
employment Cdmpensation, page 167 supra.
30. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act § 29(c), as amended; 12 Micu. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1944) § 17.531(c) (emphasis supplied).
31. See Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N. NV. (2d) 689 (1942); In re Steelman,
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Such a construction, the employer claimed, would make the statute
unconstitutional "because it does not base disqualification for benefits
upon a determination of the merits of the labor dispute resulting in
unemployment, and because it imposes a penalty against the employer,
which constitutes an intervention by the State in behalf of the em-
ployees in the labor dispute." 32 The state agency replied, "If appel-
lant's arguments are correct then benefits may not be paid in any case
without adjudication that the employer has committed a vrongful act
because all benefit payments are charged to an employer's experience
record. Since none of the eligibility (Sec. 28) or disqualification (See.
29) provisions of the act are based upon a consideration of whether the
employer has been at fault, the whole unemployment program would
be unconstitutional.
' 33
The employer's argument, said the Court, "is based upon the premise
that the payment of compensation to employees on strike is a penalty
upon the employer, because its rate of contribution to the unemploy-
ment fund will thereby be increased." 3. The Court's answer to this
premise was decisive, although the reasoning would bear amplification:
"The public purpose of the unemployment compensation lawv is
to alleviate the distress of unemployment, and the payment of bene-
fits is not conditioned upon the merits of the labor dispute causing
unemployment. Likewise, the required contribution of the em-
ployer to the unemployment compensation fund is not determined
upon the basis of the merits of the dispute. The increase in the
amount of the employer's contribution to the fund because of its ex-
perience record of payments to employees is not in any sense a pen-
alty. By the unemployment compensation act, the legislature pro-
vided a method of determining the employer's contribution to the
compensation fund, and it did not see fit to base the amount of such
contribution upon the merits of a labor dispute or upon the right or
wrongdoing of the employer in connection with such dispute." 3
Actually the labor dispute disqualification in the Michigan law, as in
most other state unemployment compensation laws, would deny benefits
to strikers whose unemployment is due to a stoppage of work existing
because of a labor dispute even though the dispute is solely the fault of
the employer. On the supposed basis of a public policy of neutrality as
between employer and labor engaged in a labor dispute, the provision
219 N. C. 306, 13 S. E. (2d) 544 (1941). These decisions reviewed the prior administrative
interpretations. The Michigan court criticizes the decision in Board of Review v. Alid-
Continent Petroleum Corp., 193 Okla. 36, 141 P. (2d) 69 (1943) in which "stoppage of
work" was construed to refer to the individual worker's, not the employer's, operations.
32. As summarized by the court, 308 ,Mich. at 213, 13 N. W. (2d) at 265.
33. Reply brief for Commission-Appellee, p. 10.
34. 308 Mlich. at 214, 13 N. W. (2d) at 265.
35. ibid.
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denies benefits in lockouts as well as strikes, and in cases where a labor
dispute is due to the employer's violation of a legal contract or state or
federal law. Whatever may be thought of the merits of such a policy
of neutrality even when it means neutrality toward other policies of the
state itself, it is clear that unemployment resulting from a labor dispute
is not compensated on the basis of fault on the part of the employer.
But a line must be drawn somewhere if individuals are not to be ex-
cluded indefinitely from the protection of the unemployment compen-
sation law when unemployment originating in a labor dispute continues
for other reasons, perhaps long after the labor dispute itself is over.
The employer may permanently reduce his labor force, change its
membership, or for other reasons no longer have work available for
those who were involved in the dispute. Some laws draw the line where
unemployment is found to be no longer "due to a labor dispute in
active progress." But since the "active progress" of a labor dispute is
something of uncertain nature and calling for highly subjective deter-
mination, most laws have attempted a more objective measure. By
drawing the line where unemployment is no longer due to "a stoppage
of work which exists because of a labor dispute," they have provided a
rule of thumb which in general prevents the payment of compensation
to workers involved in the dispute while the employer's operations are
substantially affected, but ends the disqualification when unemploy-
ment ceases to be due to the tangible effects of the dispute and con-
tinues because of lack of available work. 6
A stoppage of work at one establishment may also be caused by a
labor dispute at another, e.g., where a railroad strike causes a factory
to shut down for lack of transportation. While the workers involved in
the dispute will be denied benefits, those laid off at other establishments
because of a secondary stoppage of production will be compensated
although their employers are not to blame for their unemployment.37
Thus, the labor dispute pr6vision, both in denying compensation and
in permitting it, is an apt illustration of the dependence of eligibility
and disqualification upon the legislature's judgment of whether pay-
ment of unemployment compensation is in the interest of the general
welfare rather than upon employer-fault in causing unemployment.
Moreover, under the Michigan law and most other unemployment
compensation laws, the payment of compensation is reflected in the
"experience" of those employers who employed the claimant in the
past period of employment from which his benefit rights are derived.
It is the so-called "base-period employer" whose contribution rate may
be affected, whether or not he is the employer involved in the labor
dispute-or, as in other cases, the employer from whom the claimant
36. See Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, page 167 supra.
37. See ibid.
EMPLOYER FAULT
has most recently been separated. If the striking employees of the
Lawrence Baking Company had immediately secured other jobs, and
subsequently been laid off for lack of work, compensation for such later
unemployment might have been charged to the La-wence Baking
Company as a base-period employer. For all that appears in the case,
compensation actually paid them over the company's protest may have
been charged to other employers who had paid the claimants' base-
period wages. 5
The prevailing methods of relating compensation to the "experience"
of individual employers thus accentuate the lack of any necessary im-
plication of fault on their part in causing the unemployment reflected
in their experience. Their contribution rates are measured by their
experience with the risk of unemployment as it affects the workers
whom they have employed, not by their responsibility for the risk's
being realized in individual cases. It would be anomalous for experi-
ence rating, itself generally disregarding questions of employer fault,
to make eligibility and disqualification for benefits depend upon em-
ployer fault. Variable rates to reflect relative risk and to provide an
incentive to reduce risk do not imply a measurement of fault any more
in Unemployment Compensation than in Workmen's Compensation, a
program whose basic objective and very reason for being have been to
provide compensation regardless of employer fault.
In Minnesota the conflict between employer fault and general welfare
as guides to interpretation was recently brought to perhaps its most
direct determination so far in the unemployment compensation pro-
gram, in the case of Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corporation. - The
claimant, who had previously been in good health, after working in an
ordnance plant for about fourteen months collapsed and was sent to
the hospital. Her doctor advised her that she "would not recover as
long as she continued [at the plant]." She was incapacitated for about
four months, during which time she was almost blind as the result of
her past work. After her recovery she worked for twNo other employers
until she was laid off because of a shortage of materials; she then regis-
tered for work and claimed unemployment compensation.
38. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act § 20, 12 Mica. STAT. AN:. (Supp.
1944) § 17.521. See also Arnold, Experience Raling, page 218 infra, at 234-5.
39. See id. at 237-8; ITERTATE CON-FERENCEOFUNESPLO IETSECRITYAGICES,
UNANIMOUS REPORT: EXPERIENCE RATING UNDER UNEMFLOYIENr Co!.IrzrNIAToN LAws
(1940) 40, recommending that charges be made on the basis of having paid the claimant the
wages entitling him to benefits, rather than having caused his unemployment:
"Does liability inhere in the act of discharging a worker who subcquently re-
ceives benefits, or in the payment of mages? If it is concluded that the act of dik-
charge itself is not an equitable method of assessing liability-and this seems a
logical conclusion-then it follows that liability inheres primarily in the payment
of wages."
40. 18 N. W. (2d) 249 (Minn. 1945).
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The state unemployment compensation agency decided, after a
hearing, that the claimant had not discontinued her employment at
the ordnance plant "voluntarily and without good cause attributable
to the employer," and awarded benefits. 41 The ordnance company
appealed,- contending (1) that, since the claimant had left its employ
without action by the company, her leaving was voluntary, and (2)
that her leaving was "without good cause attributable to the em-
ployer," which, according to the company's argument, must mean
"some unreasonable conduct on the part of the employer which causes
the employee to resign." 42 Both of these contentions were related to
the experience rating provisions of the unemployment compensation
law on the theory that payment of benefits to one in the claimant's
circumstances was precluded by the purpose of experience rating to
encourage employers to stabilize employment.
43
The Minnesota Supreme Court looked to the legislative declaration
of policy 44 and concluded that "There is nothing in this language to
justify the conclusion that benefits under the act accrue only when
unemployment is the result of some wrongful act or fault of an em-
ployer." 4 The effect of benefit payments upon employers' experience
rating was recognized, but not as altering the avowed legislative pur-
pose to promote the general welfare by providing benefits to those who
are unemployed through no fault of their own. The court decisively
rejected the fallacy that because experience rating makes it to the in-
terest of an employer to maintain stable employment whenever possible,
the payment of benefits is limited to cases where unemployment is due
to the employer's fault. It proceeded then to decide against the ein-
41. Minn. Laws 1943, c. 650, § 5(A), amending 1 MINN. STAT. (1941) § 268.09 provides
that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits "If such individual voluntarily and with-
out good cause attributable to the employer discontinued his employment by such employer
and all wage credit earned in such employment shall be cancelled." On this disqualification
in general see Kempfer, Disqualification for Voluntary Leavlng and Misconduct, page 147
supra.
42. Brief of Relator, Minn. Sup. Ct., p. 24.
43. Id. at 15-7.
44. 1 MINN. STAT. (1941) § 268.03: "As a guide to the interpretation and application
of sections 268.03 to 268.24, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Eco-
nomic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare
of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general in.
terest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread
and to lighten its burdens. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more
stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employ-
ment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power
and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, there-
fore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the
citizens of this state will be promoted by providing, under the police powers of the state for
the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own.
45. 18 N. W. (2d) at 252 (emphasis the court's).
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ployer on each issue, in a way which indicates rather strongly the
contrast in effect between the general-welfare approach and the
employer-fault approach:
(1) \Vhether the claimant left her employment "voluntarily" was
decided by whether "continuance thereof would endanger her health
and personal welfare." The test is not whether the employer or the
worker acted to terminate the employment but whether the termina-
tion, if the worker's act, was "an act of necessity." ' "... where, as
here, an employe is impelled because of sickness and disease to termi-
nate employment because continuance thereof would endanger his
health and personal welfare, such termination is an involuntary rather
than a voluntary act on the part of the employe" even though the em-
ployer has also submitted involuntarily to the termination.r
If a leaving is involuntary, there is no disqualification whether the
cause is attributable to the employer or not. The court approves an
Attorney General's opinion which made the distinction quite clear.
"As I view it," the Attorney General had written, " 'voluntarily quit-
ting' means discontinuing the employment because the employee no
longer desires to remain in the relationship of an employee with the
employer from whom he has separated"; therefore, he concluded, an
employee compelled to separate from his employment by a force beyond
his control could not be said to have left voluntarily even though the
cause for the discontinuance was found to be not attributable to the
employer. 4s Although there is uncertainty due to the overlapping of
the two issues in the Fannon case, a fair inference from the Court's
own opinion and its approval of the Attorney General's is that faced
with "an act of necessity" from causes wholly unconnected with a
claimant's employment the Court would find that the claimant had not
left voluntarily and was therefore not subject to the disqualification.
Circumstances of less compelling force than necessary to make the
leaving involuntary, however, may still be good cause for leaving and if
"attributable to the employer" then preclude disqualification.
(2) Whether the claimant had "good cause attributable to the
employer" was held to be independent of the test of whether there was
"any wrongful act, negligence, or failure on the part of the employer."
A worker's leaving may be for "good cause attributable to the em-
ployer," the court emphasized, "even though the employer be free
from all negligence or wrongdoing in connection therewith." It is a
question of relation, rather than responsibility for sins of either omis-
46. Room is left for distinctions of degree between serious impairment of health and
relatively minor discomforts and unhealthful effects. "Necessity" is a matter of degree.
47. IS N. W. (2d) at 252.
48. Opinion of the Att'y Gen., No. 151, Oct. 12, 1943, CCH Unemployment Ins. S2rv.
--Minn. 1975.06.
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sion or commission. "Factors or circumstances directly connected with
employment" are attributable to the employer.4"
Affirmative standards for determining good cause for leaving work
were drawn from the statutory provision for determining whether an
unemployed individual has refused suitable work."0 "Under this sec-
tion, a claimant cannot be disqualified for refusing to accept employ-
ment which may be a risk to or endanger his health. If this be true,
then certainly it is unreasonable to hold that a claimant must lose
credits or be denied benefits where he has been compelled to terminate
employment because such employment has resulted in a physical condi-
tion or disease likewise dangerous to health and personal safety." 1
These standards clearly represent interests of the worker which are
deemed worthy of legislative protection, rather than conditions of
employment for which an employer is held affirmatively responsible. 2
Some of them overlap to greater or less extent obligations imposed on
employers by law. For example, an employer may be bound to take
certain measures of safety. Still he has no general obligation to prevent
risks to his workers' health. Work may be unsuitable by these stand-
ards without any implication of failure on the part of the employer to
meet legal or any other standards of conduct. What is to be expected
of workers, not what is required of employers, is the general standard
by which claimants are to be awarded or denied benefits.
As these standards of "suitable work" are clearly related to the in-
dividual, testing what is suitable for him, measuring risk to his health
and safety, it is evident that it is the effect upon the individual claim-
ant, not the effect of the same circumstances upon other workers, which
is decisive. The court referred to the claimant's allergy to gunpowder
49. 18 N. W. (2d) at 252.
The phrase "attributable to the employer," so construed, still limits the adequacy of
the remedy for involuntary unemployment. It may deny benefits to individuals whose
current unemployment is solely due to lack of suitable work, simply because a past separa-
tion was for reasons which though good reasons were not related to the employment. Com.
pare the recommendation of the COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD (1944) 1, that "Each state should re-examilne its
statutory provisions governing disqualifications to be certain that the penalties imposed do
not restrict the right of an individual to change his work for good personal or family rea-
sons."
50. 1 MINN. STAT. (1941) § 268.09 (4)(a), (b) provides that "In determining whether
or not any work is suitable for an individual, the director shall consider the degree of risk
involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experi-
ence and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects of securing local work
in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence,"
and further provides that "no work shall be deemed suitable" under certain conditions,
See Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, page 134 supra, on the general subject of standards of
suitable work.
51. 18 N. W. (2d) at 252 (emphasis the court's).
52. See Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, page 134 supra.
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and apparently understood that this contributed to her illness. The
fact that other workers might not suffer similar effects was considered
immaterial. The language of the disqualification for voluntary leaving
is specific in saying "withwut good cause attributable to the employer."
It is not a test of proximate cause to determine responsibility but a test
of whether good cause attributable to the employer contributed to the
claimant's leaving, regardless of what other causes may also have con-
tributed.
An amendment to the Minnesota law, adopted in 1943, 3 cancelling
wage credits for an individual who "cannot accept his former employ-
ment when offered by such employer for reasons not attributable to
such employer or if he is unable to perform such work," gave the em-
ployer another argument for disqualification. This is the type of
amendment in unemployment compensation laws which results from
legislative compromise betveen the fundamental public purpose of the
law to alleviate the effects of unemployment and the concept of unem-
ployment compensation as a penalty upon employers for causing un-
employment. Despite the literal effect of the language of the provision,
however, the court refused to believe that the legislature intended "to
subject an individual to physical risk or disease in connection with his
employment in order to remain qualified for benefits," while carefully
safeguarding unemployed claimants generally against being forced by
threat of disqualification to accept unsuitable work. It concluded,
therefore, that disqualification for failure to accept former employment
was meant to apply only when such employment ,as suitable for the
claimant.
If unemployment compensation were a penalty upon a claimant's
former employer for failing to keep the claimant employed, there would
of course be a logical distinction between the refusal of former employ-
ment and the refusal of a job with another employer. But the risk to
the individual's health and safety is obviously the same, and from the
point of view of the State's purpose to promote the general welfare of
its citizens, the court's interpretation is clearly in harmony with the
unemployment compensation law as a whole. Orthodox rules of con-
struction support the court in looking to the legislative intent in the
entire act, in presuming that the legislature did not intend an unrea-
sonable result, and in maintaining the effect of the original suitable
work provisions against an implied amendment.14 An unemployment
compensation law is so definitely an organic whole that there is special
justification for not permitting the basic plan of the program to be
impaired by piecemeal amendments unless the legislature makes it
53. Minn. Laws 1943, c. 650, § 5(7)[G], amending I MAmln. STAT. (1941) § 263.09.
Mnm. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1944) § 4337-27(7)[G].
54. 2 SUTHERLAI-D, STATUTORY CONsTRucTmiO (3d ed. 1943) §§ 4703, 4706; 1 id. at
§§ 1934, 1935.
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entirely clear that it intends such a result. Where the legislature adds
an odd fixture to the edifice it is in the best traditions of the judicial
function to incorporate the addition with the least possible conflict
with the architecture of the whole. Still it is an uncertain and unsatis-
factory business to rely on hard interpretations to mitigate bad amend-
ments. In this instance the legislature proceeded to confirm the court's
judgment of the legislative purpose by repealing the amendment."
The Two Approaches Contrasted.
The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota, all of
them states with employer contributions as the means of financing the
entire costs of compensation and all with experience rating, have thus
rejected employer fault as a test of compensable unemployment. They
have made it plain that a public program to alleviate the economic
and social consequences of unemployment, plus a method of financing
by means of taxes on employment, plus a system of variable rates re-
flecting past experience with the risk of unemployment rather than
fault in causing unemployment, do not add up to make a system of
employer liability for fault.
But the ghost of employer fault as a test of compensability has
haunted the unemployment compensation program as it previously
haunted workmen's compensation." No court of last resort has estab-
lished it, with any definiteness or consistency, as legal doctrine. Its
effect has been rather as a subversive influence, hard to isolate and
positively identify as an element of decision, yet apparently diverting
courts and administrative tribunals occasionally from the purpose of
the unemployment compensation laws to protect the general welfare
from the effects of involuntary unemployment."' Sometimes the con-
cept seems to be used as a test of actual breach of legal obligation, more
often as an undefined standard of responsibility." In spite of the con-
55. Minn. Laws 1945, c. 376, effective July 1, 1945.
56. See, e.g., SAMUEL BERTRAM HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WVORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS (1944) 99-108 on the variety of injuries incurred at work for which
the defense to compensation has been an "act of God."
57. For discussion of the use and abuse of the term "involuntary unemployment" see
Harrison, Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary Unemployment," page 117 supra.
58. See the cases cited hereafter to illustrate the employer-fault approach to specific
issues of eligibility and disqualification. Cf., e.g., the language of the Michigan circuit court
quoted at the beginning of this article ["there was nothing to show that there was any obliga-
tion on the part of the employer to change shift for her"] with the decision of the South
Dakota court in Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 13 N. W. (2d) 498 (S. D.
1944), disqualifying a worker who sought reemployment after childbirth on the theory that
benefits were intended only for those "unemployed because of the failure of industry to
provide employment." Since even so the claimant would have been entitled to benefits,
being currently unemployed only for lack of a job, the court's premise seems to have been
that her previous employer was not responsible for her previous loss of her job; therefore no
benefits.
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cept's lack of substance as legal doctrine, there is a vital difference in
analysis and results between decisions reached from the point of viev
of a former employer as an adversary party," measuring his responsi-
bility for a claimant's unemployment, and decisions reached from the
point of view of the general welfare, testing whether the unemployment
for which compensation is claimed is excluded for reasons of public
policy from the benefits of the law.
If the issue is whether the claimant is "available for work," the
employer-fault approach is to interpret "work" as meaning the par-
ticular work the claimant "has been doing," as if he were claiming
damages for breach of an employment contract, and to deny benefits if
through no fault of the employer the claimant cannot continue in his
former work, even though he has the best of reasons and is ready and
willing to take other, suitable work. A mother who is admittedly avail-
able for work between 7:00 in the morning and 12:00 at night is held
"unavailable for work" because in order to care for her children she
must discontinue a job on the midnight shift;11 although a worker who
will not accept her employer's change in her work hours from a five-
day week on a day shift to a six-day week on the night shift is held
available for work because the employer, in changing hours, has made
the working conditions unsuitable for her."' A worker who leaves
because of colds attributed to a drafty workplace is held unavailable,
with the comment,
"At this day and age there is statutory provision for supervision
59. This is related to the tendency to think of unemployment compenration claims a-
claims against an employer rather than upon a public trust fund for unemployed worlrz,
with the result "that contests regarding the payment of benefits are considercd to Le betvecn
the worker and his employer, with the State administrator only a bystander." See addrecs
by Chairman Altmeyer of Social Security Board in INTERnsrz COmENr:C.E or E'iuLoy-
YEzT SECURITY AGENCIES, PROCEEDINGS OF SEVENTH ANNUAL IEETiNG (1943) (). )And
see Stevens v. Minnesota Division of Employment and Security, 207 Minn. 429, 431, 291
N. W. 890, 891 (1940): "It is plain that the [unemployment compensationl act does not
impose any duty or obligation upon [employer] in favor of [claimant). It is only against the
special fund, created by this legislation, that [claimant] may assert any claim for unemploy-
ment compensation. The only duty this law lays upon the employer is to pay the proper
amount to the fund." Courts have emphasized the necessity of administrative initiative
and responsibility in establishing rights to unemployment compensation, rather than um-
piring contests between employers and claimants. See, e.g., Hagadone v. Kirlpatricl: and
Unemployment Comp. Division, 154 P. (2d) 181 (Idaho 1944); and see Silverstone, The
Administration of UMnmploymdnt Compensation, page 205 infra.
60. Judson Mills v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. (2d) 535
(1944). See also Altman and Lewis, Limited Arailabilit for S~ift Erzp!oyn, cn: A Critcrion
of Eligibility for Unemployment Compensation (1944) 22 N. C. L. REv. 189 and (1944) 23
MINN. L. REv. 387.
61. Lee v. Spartan Mills, S. C. Ct. of C. P., Spartanburg Cy., April 3, 1944, CCl Un-
employment Ins. Serv.-S. C. c 8123, applying the decision of the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Judson Mills v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. (2d) 535
(1944).
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of work shops. The superintendent has authority to see that they
are properly heated and ventilated and other normal working con-
ditions provided for. This would not mean that every work shop
must be so regulated as to meet anything more than normal con-
ditions and situations." 62
But the general-welfare approach is to interpret "work" as meaning
suitable work and test the claimant's availability by his attachment to
the labor market and his readiness and willingness to work, rather
than his readiness to continue in his last job."1 The employer-fault
approach, in requiring availability for the work he has been doing, will
disregard injury to the worker's health, 4 family obligations,"6 or any
other circumstance for which the former employer is not responsible!60
The general-welfare approach, while recognizing that unemployment
compensation is limited to those who are ready, willing and able to
work,67 will not require continuance in a particular job in disregard of
62. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Rev., 70 Ohio App. 370, 378, 45 N. E. (2d)
152, 156 (1942).
63. See, e.g., Faulkenberry v. Dep't of Industrial Relations, Ala. C. C., Madison Cy.,
March 21, 1944, CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-Ala. 8127, Ben. Ser. 8657-Ala.'Ct. D.
(V7-8); Carani v. Danaher, Conn. Super. Ct., Hartford Cy., Oct. 18, 1943, CCH Unem-
ployment Ins. Serv.-Conn. 8132, Ben. Ser. 8416-Conn. Ct. D (V7-3); see also Henry v.
Ford Motor Co., 291 Mich. 535, 289 N. W. 244 (1939). Among administrative decisions see
Ben. Ser. 2692-Ore. A (V3-2); Ben. Ser. 8963-Ill. R. (V7-12); Ben. Ser. 8852-Pa. R (V7-10).
And see Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, page 123 supra, on the general sub-
ject.
The requirement was adopted from the British Unemployment Insurance Act and its
previously established meaning might therefore be presumed to have been intended by the
state legislatures. Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N. W. (2d) 689 (1942). The British
decisions had consistently tested availability in relation to the labor market generally rather
than the claimants' previous work. See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, BENEFIT DEcisioNs OF
THE BlrisH UMPaE (Ben. Ser., Gen. Supp. No. 1, 1938). These decisions were apparently
not considered by the Ohio and South Carolina courts in the cases cited supra notes 60 and
62.
64. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Rev., 70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. (2d) 152
(1942); Stevens v. Selby Shoe Co., Ohio Ct. App., Scioto Cy., Jan. 15, 1945, CCH Unem-
ployment Ins. Serv.-Ohio 8163.
65. Judson Mills v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. (2d) 535
(1944); Huiet v. Schwob Mfg. Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S. E. (2d) 743 (1943) (a wife who "chooses
between continuing employment and living with her husband" in a new locality, though
available for work there, "waives her status as an insured employee.")
66. Carwood Mfg. Co. v. Huiet, Ga. Super. Ct., Barrow Cy., June 5, 1943, CCH Un-
employment Ins. Serv.-Ga. 1950.06 (worker whose transportation to previous job had
failed held unavailable for work since there was no "duty on the employer , . .to furnish
such means of transportation"; whether claimant was available for other work not con-
sidered.)
67. Availability for a particular job is not necessary to prevent unemployment com-
pensation being used as "sick benefits," since availability for other gainful work is required.
See Labor and Industry Dep't v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., Pa. Super. Ct., Jan.
27, 1944, CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-Pa. 8096, correcting this misconception In its
early opinion in Labor and Industry Dep't v. Uneiiployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 133 Pa.
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the state's interest in the health and safety of its citizens and in the
maintenance of family life.
If the issue is whether the claimant has been "discharged for mis-
conduct connected with his work" the employer-fault approach is to
look to whether the employer was justified in discharging him, while
the general-welfare approach is concerned less with employer conduct
than with the need of alleviating the effects of unemployment among
those discharged for reasons not inconsistent with their being bona fide
workers involuntarily out of work!3
If the issue is whether the claimant has left work voluntarily without
good cause, the employer-fault approach tends to assume that either
employer or worker must be held responsible for any separation so that
any leaving without action by the employer must be a voluntary leav-
ing.'9 The general-welfare approach, not assuming that one or the
other must be held responsible, will recognize that a worker may quit
because he has to as well as because he wants to; voluntary leaving is
understood not as a legislative redundancy but as distinct from a leav-
ing which is "an act of necessity." "I In deciding whether there was
"good cause" for a worker's voluntary leaving, the employer-fault ap-
proach is first to read "good cause" as meaning "good cause attribut-
able to the employer," when not so limited in the statute, on the premise
that the limitation is implicit in the general policy of the law.71 With
"attributable to the employer" in the statute either by enactment or
Super. 518,3 A. (2d) 211 (1938). And see Fellela v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., R. I. Sup2r.
Ct., Nov. 3, 1943, CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.\-R. I. 8039, holding that no benefits
under the Rhode Island Cash Sictmess Compensation Act (the only such state law now in
effect) can be paid to one who is able to perform services for wages though unable to do his
regular work. With such a disability compensation law, the "previous job" test of availa-
bility for work under the unemployment compensation law would leave such claimants
stranded between the two programs.
68. Perhaps in part due to the leading decision of the W'isconsin court in Boynton Cab
Co. v. Neubeck, discussed above, the employer-fault approach, though often argued, has
been less evident in the decisions in these cases than in others. But see Ben. Svr. 8101-La.
A (V6-8) (claimant disqualified for discharge because of absence due to rdiance on a car-
pool and failure to arrange other transportation); Ben. Ser. 8276-Tean. A (V6-12) (dis-
qualified for discharge because of failure to use the diligence of a reasonably prudent man);
and see discussion of general subject in Kempfer, Disqualificationfor Voluntary Lca ring and
Misconduct, page 147 supra.
69. Labor and Industry Dep't v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 133 Pa. Supar.
518, 3 A. (2d) 211 (1938) (leaving on doctor's advice held voluntary regardlezs of necezity
to preserve health. "He was not discharged, dismissed or laid off by his employer"; there-
fore he quit voluntarily).
70. Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 18 N. W. (2d) 249 (Minn. 1945), discuz:Ld in
the text above. See also Kempfer, Disqualification for Voluntary Licaving and Miscondua,
page 147, supra, at 155.
71. Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 13 N. W. (2d) 493 (S. D. 1944);
and see Kempfer, Disqualification for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, page 147 supra,
at 157.
1945]
ELIGIBILITY AND DISQUALIFICATION [Vol.55:181
by interpretation, the employer-fault approach is to determine whether
any wrongful act, negligence, or breach of obligation on the part of the
employer was responsible for the claimant's leaving. But the general-
welfare approach is to read "good cause" without limitation, if so the
legislature wrote it, and to recognize as good cause any facts which
made a claimant's voluntary leaving reasonable conduct in the circum-
stances.7 2. If the statute itself says "good cause attributable to the
employer," the test is whether facts connected with either the employer
personally or the employment, regardless of fault, contributed to the
claimant's leaving and made his leaving reasonable in the circum-
stances; the claimant will not be disqualified for leaving work which is
unsuitable by legislative tests prescribed in the interest of the general
welfare, even though the employer is not to blame for the work's being
unsuitable.
73
If the issue is whether the claimant, in not accepting reemployment,
has refused an offer of suitable work without good cause, the employer-
fault approach may look only to circumstances for which the employer
is responsible to determine the suitability of the work or the claimant's
good cause for refusing it.74 The general-welfare approach, on the other
hand, will look to all the circumstances of the offered work in relation
to the claimant, in order to determine the reasonableness of the claim-
ant's refusal, rather than the employer's responsibility. 7
To some extent decisions which seem to illustrate the employer-fault
approach might be explained as the result of statutory details rather
72. Id. at 158.
73. Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 18 N. W. (2d) 249 (Minn. 1945).
74. United States Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Rev., W. Va. C. C., Kanawha Cy.,
April 3, 1943, CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-V. Va., 1965.022; Feuchtenberger Bak-
eries, Inc. v. Board of Rev., W. Va. C. C., Kanawha Cy., April 15, 1943, ibid. (both cases of
refusal to return to jobs in West Virginia after moving to another state; distance held im-
material since claimant had moved). Cf. Matter of Weymouth, W. Va. C. C., 13th Judicial
Cir., March 26, 1943, CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-W. Va. 11965.012 (claimant,
whose employer refused to let her go back to work after two days absence, of which she had
given advance notice without objection from the employer, refused similar work at other
stores of the same company six and twelve miles away; whether claimant "should or should
not" have refused on account of transportation difficulties and home duties "presents a
close question .. .which would never have arisen had she not been dismissed." Held, no
disqualification in view of circumstances of dismissal and fact that new offer was made
months later when claimant applied for benefits).
75. Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 18 N. W. (2d) 249 (Minn. 1945); Forrest Park
Sanitarium v. Miller, 233 Iowa 1341, 11 N. W. (2d) 582 (1943); Ben. Ser. 8088-N. J. R (V6-
8) (former laundry worker who left to take a defense training course and refused to return to
her old job held not to have refused suitable work without good cause in view of her new skill
and prospects for a better job in war industry); Ben. Ser. 8447-Mass. A (V7-3) (claimant
who refused former job because of constant friction with foreman during previous employ-
ment held to have good cause for refusal, without determining the merits of the "friction").
See generally Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, page 134 supra.
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than any general concept of the unemployment compensation law as a
whole. Thus, the Ohio court, in requiring availability for the work the
claimant had been doing, despite its injurious effects, implied that a
different interpretation would have been reached if the legislature in
prescribing what work might be refused wNithout disqualification had
used a standard of "suitable work," as other states did, instead of
specifying certain conditions ithout relating them to any such general
standard. 6 But, by and large, such statutory variations seem less con-
trolling than the tribunal's sense of the basic policy of the unemploy-
ment compensation law. A Massachusetts court, with a statutory dis-
qualification for voluntary leaving "without good cause attributable
to the employing unit or its agent," held that a leaving because of work-
ing hours injurious to the claimant's health was not voluntary,nw but the
South Dakota court, with a statute recognizing "good cause" for leav-
ing, unlimited by any reference to the employer, disqualified for leav-
ing because of risk to the claimant's health during pregnancy.,- And
the Iowa Commission, with "good cause" unlimited in the statute, dis-
qualified a worker for leaving on account of injurious working condi-
tions;79 three years later with apparently a more-liberal view of the
purpose of the law but -with the statute amended meanwhile to recog-
nize only "good cause attributable to his employer," the Commission
held working conditions to be attributable to the employer regardless
of fault and refused to disqualify a worker who left because they were
injurious to his health, even though the employer had taken "every pre-
caution" to correct them.s° Such decisions as those of the Ohio and
South Carolina courts construing availability for work as availability
for the claimant's previous job, and that of the South Dakota court on
voluntary leaving without good cause, are all justified in the opinions
by the general policy of the law more than by any specific statutory
language."' The explanation of the employer-fault approach seems to
lie deeper than in statutory details, in a concept of unemployment com-
pensation as a liability imposed on the individual employer for causing
the unemployment of individual workers, and a sense of injustice if the
liability is imposed for unemployment due to no fault of the employer.
It is the objection made at the beginning of the unemployment com-
pensation program-and rejected by the United States Supreme Court
76. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Rev., 70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. (2d) 152
(1942).
77. Mitchell v. Division of Unemployment Comp. (1943), Ben. S r. 8074-Mass. Ct.
D (V6-7).
78. Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 13 N. W. (2d) 493 (S. D. 1944).
79. Unpublished decision, 1939, No. 39 C-49.
80. Ben. Ser. 7819-Iovwa R (k6-2).
81. Browa-Brockmeyer Co. v. Board of Rev., 70 Ohio App. 370, 45 N. E. (2d) 152
(1942); Judson Mills v. Unemployment Comp. 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. (2d) 535 (1944);
Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 13 N. WV. (2d) 498 (S. D. 1944).
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-that "those who pay the tax may not have contributed to the unem-
ployment," 52 or going even further, that although their operations may
have contributed to the unemployment they were not to blame."3
Conclusion.
Since hardly any Unemployment would be found to be due to a
breach of legal obligation on the part of a former employer, the theory
of employer fault applied in that sense as a test of compensability would
substantially eliminate unemployment compensation. Taken in a looser
sense, the argument of employer fault is that, especially with experi-
ence rating, the employer is unfairly "penalized" if benefits are paid
for unemployment due to circumstances beyond his control. Yet un-
employment following an ordinary lay-off of workers by an employer
for lack of work is compensated without any question of how blameless,
or even helpless, the employer may have been. Wartime restrictions,
termination of war contracts, or ordinary business hazards may make
his action unavoidable, but it makes no difference in the determination
of his former workers' rights to unemployment compensation.8 4 The
voluntary quit of a customer may be no more the fault of an employer
than the voluntary quit of a worker;5 its effect in causing unemploy-
ment and an unfavorable rating of the employer's experience may be
much greater. Yet no one, presumably, would now question the pay-
ment of benefits for unemployment resulting from the customer's vol-
untary quit, nor their being counted as part of the employer's experi-
ence with the risk of unemployment.
82. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 521 (1937).
83. As in Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 18 N. W. (2d) 249, (Minn. 1945) where
compensation was contested because the claimant's separation from the appellant-employer,
though due to working conditions, was not due to "unreasonable conduct" on the employer's
part.
84. "... Unemployment in the plant of one employer may be due to competition with
another, within or without the state, whose factory is running to capacity; or to tariffs, in-
ventions, changes in fashions or in market or business conditions, for which no employer is
responsible, but which may stimulate the business of one and impair or even destroy that of
another. Many believe that the responsibility for the business cycle, the chief cause of un.
employment, cannot be apportioned to individual employers in accordance with their em-
ployment experience; that a business may be least responsible for the depression from which
it suffers the most." Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 524 (1937).
85. If experience rating is thought of as an incentive to positive effort to reduce unem-
ployment (see Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, page 1
supra) it might be especially applicable to such problems of personnel management. The
individual employer may be able to do more to reduce voluntary quits and discharges for
misconduct than to reduce unemployment due to more remote and impersonal economic
causes. See, e.g., ELTON MAYO, THE HUMAN PROBLEM,,S OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION
(1933); ELTON MAYO AND GEORGE F. F. LOMBARD, TEAMWORK AND LABOR TURNovEit IN
THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (Harvard School of Business Adminis-
tration, Business Research Studies No. 32, 1944); numerous articles in Factory Managellcnt
an4Maintenance and in The Personnel Journal; and the popularization of technical studies
in STUART CHASE, MEN AT WORK (1945).
EMPLOYER FAULT
And we find the Wisconsin Advisory Committee on Unemployment
Compensation, representing employers as well as labor, and the Wis-
consin Manufacturers Association, joining the State Industrial Com-
mission in persuading the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that unemploy-
ment compensation has no relation to a claim against an employer for
fault on his part, that eligibility and disqualification are based solely
on considerations of public policy, and that, to quote again language
too emphatic for paraphrase, "nothing could strike the cause of experi-
ence rating a more grievous blow than to have it prostituted to this
purpose" of "allowing employers to restrict and sabotage the efficient
operation of the primary purpose of any unemployment compensation
law, namely, the payment of benefits to out-of-work employees." 11
Experiments and studies in the direction of guaranteed annual wages
show a promise of accomplishment, where circumstances permit, in the
assumption by employers of contractual responsibility for stable em-
ployment. 87 But the purpose of unemployment compensation is both
less and greater than that. In the words of President Johnston of the
United States Chamber of Commerce, "Benefit payments are only half-
rations.'"- If unemployed workers were compensated on the basis of
the fault of a past employer, the measure of compensation should cer-
tainly be the amount of the worker's loss. As it is, the unemployed
worker and his family still bear most of the loss directly, and the public
at large bears it indirectly through the social consequences of lowered
standards of living, loss of purchasing power, and often the burden of
supplementary relief. 9 On the other hand, the purpose of unemploy-
ment compensation laws goes beyond instability of the job a worker
has, to include unemployment due to the job a worker cannot find. To
quote Mr. Johnston further, it is necessary to "encourage mobility,
flexibility, adaptation and retraining in order to absorb more continu-
ously and promptly all of our labor power." 0 The employer-fault con-
cept, tying the worker to his past job, is incompatible with such pur-
poses.
Unquestionably the purpose of the unemployment compensation
laws to serve the general welfare does not call for indiscriminate pay-
ments to the unemployed. Eligibility conditions and disqualifications
86. See page 187 supra.
* 87. See JACK CHaxcN AN GEORGE C. HELLiCso., Gu uvurs) AzuiA WAGES
(1945); Ellickson, Labor's Dernand for Real Employment Security, page 253 infra; Murnv,
THE GUARANEED AN-NukL WAGE (1945) and references therein.
88. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U. S. A., SOCLt, SECURITY N A snu c, (Addrezzes,
Nat. Conf. on Social Security, 1944) 5.
89. Employer contributions are themselves largely a cost passed on to consumers, and
to workers both as consumers and wage-earners. See F-L,=.Y A. M as am RoyAL E.
MONTGOMERY, LABOR'S RisKs Am SOCmiL INsur uCE (1933) 131.
90. CHAM BER OF COMMERCE OF THE U. S. A., SocmL SECURITY WN AMICA (Addreces ,
Nat. Conf. on Social Security, 1944) 6.
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serve their purpose in limiting the risks of the program. But what the
Supreme Courts of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota have made
clear is that such a purpose is one of public policy in the use of public
funds for insurance against the social and economic consequences of
unemployment, independent of the blamelessness of a previous em-
ployer for causing the unemployment.
